

## ISLAMIC DYNAMICS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA: IDEOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

Isman Iskandar

Institut Ilmu Al-Qur'an (IIQ) Jakarta, Indonesia

Email: isman@iiq.ac.id

### Abstract

*This article discusses the dynamics of Southeast Asian Islam: The Problem of Salafi Ideology with a focus on the three things described, namely: the problem of radical Salafi ideology, the dynamics of Southeast Asian Muslims and the handling of religious radicalism in Southeast Asia. Radical ideology is developing among Muslims who identify themselves with Salafis, namely Islamic groups or movements that call for a return to the Koran and Hadith. In subsequent developments, it underwent contextualization with various variants. The main Salafi movement is identified with the main agenda of purifying the faith or containing secularism or restoring the Islamic caliphate or a form of resistance to imperialism. The emergence of religious radicalism is a new challenge for Muslims in the midst of international relations. The characteristics of Southeast Asia are considered to be a prototype for the future of a moderate, friendly, tolerant Islam that dialogues with other civilizations. Current social, political, economic and cultural conditions in Southeast Asia have shown that the existence of Islamic communities in this region must be taken into account. Spreading moderate Islam in the Southeast Asian context has similarities with the thoughts of Azumardy Azra (1955), Jamhari Makruf (1965), Rosita Tandos (1975), Zachary Abuza (2010) and many elaborations of the thoughts of Muhammad Sa'id Ramadan al-Buti (2013) and of course will contrast with the thoughts of Salafi figures with various variations such as 'Abd al-'Aziz bin Abdullah bin Baz (1999), Sayyid Qutb (1966) Abdullah Yusuf 'Azzam (1989) which tend to be exclusive and closed.*

**Keywords:** Salafi, Radical, Southeast Asia, Terrorism, Islam.

### INTRODUCTION

Islam is the majority religion in Southeast Asia, where there are 240 million Muslims. In countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam, Islam is the religion with the most adherents. Meanwhile, in several countries such as Myanmar, Vietnam, Thailand and Singapore, Islam is a minority religion. Southeast Asia also has several other religions besides Islam.

If you look at the Muslim population, especially in Southeast Asia, from year to year it is predicted that Muslims will continue to increase by around 30% around 2030. This can be seen from the growth index between Muslims and non-Muslims. The growth of Muslims is around 1.5% while non-Muslims are 0.7% per year. It can be seen from the data series, in 1990 the number of Muslims reached 1.1 billion, in 2000 it reached 1.3 billion with a growth value of 19.9%, in 2010 it reached 1.6 billion if you look at the growth around 21.6%, In 2020 it is predicted to reach 1.9 billion with a growth value of 23.4%, and by the end of 2030 it will reach 2.2 billion, with a growth value of 24.9%. With this, Muslims occupy the first position as followers of the largest religion in the world.

Several study results confirm that Southeast Asian Islam has its own characteristics, which are different from Islam in other regions, especially in the Middle East which is the heart of the Muslim world. This is due to the process of adapting to local conditions, thus forming the unique dynamics of Southeast Asian Islam, which differentiates it from Islam

in the Middle East, Africa and other regions. The typical characteristics of Islam in Southeast Asia, for example, as stated by Azyumardi Azra, is an Islam that is more peaceful, friendly and tolerant.

Islam in Southeast Asia is complex and dynamic. The majority of Muslims in this region are Malays with a unique cultural, social and political context. Although it cannot be denied that there are existing Islamic movements that are trying to restore the glory of Islam through acts of radicalism. The problems faced by the Islamic movement revolve around radical ideology, global jihad, and religious terrorism.

A number of other controversial issues in Southeast Asian Islam such as salafism, revivalism, the current outbreak of ethno-religious conflict and the possibility of a greater threat of extremism. The relationship between the state and Islam, whether in precolonial, colonial or contemporary formats, is still an issue. Various forms of political Islamic movements have found their own forms in each country such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines with various distinctive characteristics. Not to mention the situation of Muslims who are minorities in Buddhist or Christian majority countries such as Thailand, Burma and the Philippines is even more isolated.

Radical Salafi in all its variants is still considered different from traditional Salafi because of its belief in the use of force to achieve political-religious goals. Indonesia has become the center of the Salafi movement, and their presence has been felt in Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Thailand and the Philippines. Some of these variants try to spread the concept of jihad in the sense of war. Although it cannot be denied that radicalism is a historical phenomenon of all religions, not just an Islamic phenomenon. In Islam, radical ideology is developing among Muslims who identify themselves with Salafi Islam, namely Islamic groups or movements that call for a return to the Koran and Hadith.

In subsequent developments, this calls for religious purification developed into the ideology of takfir and terror. The emergence of issues of Islamic radicalism is a new challenge for Muslims in the midst of global relations. Salafis have long been identified as a radical Islamic movement because they believe that Islam is not just a religion but also an ideology at the same time.

Responding to the description above, this paper aims to explain "Southeast Asian Islamic Dynamics: The Problem of Radical Ideology" which is formulated specifically in three descriptions:

1. To analyze the ideology of Salafi ideology as a transnational ideology and all its variant forms
2. To conduct an analysis of the dynamics of Islam in Southeast Asia and its relationship to global Islam.
3. To analyze the solution to the problem of radical salafi ideology in Southeast Asia.

## **DISCUSSION**

### **Salafi as a Transnational Ideology**

Linguistically, salaf comes from Arabic (سلف- يسلف- سلفا و سلوفا) which means previous. Salaf with this meaning is synonymous with the word qabl and is an antonym of the word

khalaf or ba'd which means to come later. Judging from a linguistic perspective, salaf has a relative meaning, because it means the previous, this meaning always flows from time to time. Each period is a salaf of the future, but a sin of the previous period. The human group that exists now is the salaf of the human group that will come later, but that group automatically becomes the khalaf of the group that has passed in the past, so the father is the salaf of his son and becomes the khalaf of his father.

The word salaf is found in the Qur'an repeatedly and all of them mean the past. The word salaf is also found in several history. In this history, Rasulullah saw. said to his daughter (Fatimah) "ni'ma al-salaf ana lak" the best of your predecessors is me. The Prophet explained that the best salaf of these people was he himself. People who follow the Prophet as understood by the Salaf al-Saleh are called Salafis. Salaf is also defined as the friends of the Prophet and the Muhajirin and Ansar groups who follow the Sunnah of the Prophet SAW. This is based on QS al-Taubah/9:100. There are also those who say that they are those who lived 300 years from the time of the Prophet. This is due to the hadith of the Prophet narrated by Imam Muslim. So salaf can be interpreted as the period of the companions and tabiin, and the first three centuries of Islam.

The term salaf is associated with the group of ulama who want to revive the qualities of the Prophet and his companions and practice them in the hope of returning to the glory and purity of Islam. This effort occurred in the 4th century H, namely the hanabilah period. During this period, the progress of thinking developed rapidly, marked by the emergence of various schools and understandings. The hanabilah group sometimes conflicts with other groups such as Asy'ariyah and calls itself people who represent Salaf ulama because it associates itself with the opinions of Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal. In the VII century H, the Salaf sect gained new strength with the emergence of Ibn Taymiyyah in Syria in the XII H century, followed by Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahab in Saudi Arabia as one of the reformist figures and mujaddid Islamists in the Arabian peninsula in the twelfth century Hijriah who loudly called for a return to the Qur'an and al-Sunnah in accordance with the understanding of the Salaf al-saleh.

Scholars are trying to find conclusions about who actually has the right to bear the label Salafi, whether they call themselves Salafis or just look at the religious methods used. Mustafa Hilmi concluded that Salafis are those who have enough three criteria, whoever has the right to bear the name Salafi is 1) Viewing the Islamic religion as one unit 2) Salaf thinking is religious progress. 3) Have identity and not be a plagiarist.

Viewing Islam as a unified whole that cannot be separated from one part to another. Because an incomplete understanding of Islam will also provide an incomplete practice. Ibn Taymiyah saw that all Islamic law is the Koran and sunnah which includes belief, worship, politics, law and government. Even as a side of Muslim life, it cannot be separated from sharia.

Salafi means returning to the understanding of Salaf which means progress in religion. Many think that returning to the Salaf is a throwback to several centuries. The term progress in the fields of science and technology and the term progress in a field are indeed different. Progress in the field of science refers to mastering the latest science and technology by

abandoning traditional forms that are irrelevant to modern life. Progress in religion is measured by the ability of adherents of that religion to apply the teachings of their religion in their lives according to the guidance of the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet.

Having an identity means that they are salafis who are firm and have confidence in their religion. They are not plagiarists of the culture and character of other nations. Muslims do not submit to anyone but make the Prophet Muhammad as a role model in their lives.

Salafi teachings entered Southeast Asia through Middle Eastern scholars, especially those who studied at universities in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. These two countries are the main or central bases for the Salafi movement throughout the world. The development of the Salafi movement in Indonesia and Southeast Asia in general received direct support from Middle Eastern Arab intellectual figures (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Yemen).

The global Islamic movement that is growing in Southeast Asia is the influence of the Islamic revival in various parts of the world. The Islamic da'wah movement in Indonesia only experienced significant development at the start of the reform era in 1998. Transnational da'wah movements and understandings (movements whose activities go beyond the territorial boundaries of countries) provide a new phenomenon for religious life in Indonesian society. preaching.

In general, the public considers the Salafiyyah da'wah movement to be a da'wah movement that is very synonymous with the terms bid'ah, shirk and kufr. Likewise, the emergence of various kinds of terror and hardline thinking from a handful of Muslims is sometimes associated with salafi, even the Indonesian Mujahideen Council (MMI), Laskar Jihad, Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), Hisbuttahrir (HT) are mentioned by some authors as part of salafiyyah., even though generalizing the name Salafiyyah to Islamic radical movements will cause a blurring of the true meaning of Salafi. With this title, the name Salafi then becomes a scourge that is avoided. The meaning of Salafi can be understood as a religious understanding of the friends of the Prophet Muhammad. and tabi'in and atba'al-tabi'in until it became an exclusive movement that separated itself from other Muslim groups.

This movement is also popular with the name Wahhabi, a name based on Imam Muhammad bin 'Abd al-Wahhab as a reformist figure and mujaddid Islamists in the Arabian Peninsula in the twelfth century Hijriah who loudly called for a return to the Qur'an and al-Sunnah in accordance with the understanding of the Salaf al-saleh.

Muslims in zmodern safe facing the Conspirathe very complicated one. More than that, the condition of Muslims nowadays is losing their power in various aspects of life. This weakness then becomes easy food for his enemies in carrying out conspiracies. Among the major conspiracies facing Muslims in the contemporary era is the conspiracy against the land of Palestine, carried out by Zionists, the United States and the United Nations.

Several media outlets stated that Western countries must realize that the main reason radical ideology is growing and developing rapidly, one of which is the arrogance of the West, which is trying to exercise massive political, ideological and economic hegemony in the Islamic world. The same thing was said Spokesperson for the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) Irfan Idris said that one of the things that makes terrorism fertile is the

arrogance of superpowers. Superpowers, he said, like to act arbitrarily, thereby triggering terrorists to emerge. "They feel wronged by the superpowers," he said in Jakarta, Thursday (19/3).

The State Intelligence Agency released data about movement Islam transnational and pits influence in Indonesia as one of the data to be able to assess an Islamic movement objectively. This can be concluded as follows:

1. It turns out that fellow international networks in Indonesia are involved in strong tensions. The Ikhwan congregation, for example, has never met HT. Meanwhile, Salafis are very persistent in criticizing the Ikhwan, HT and Jamah Tablig movements.
2. Despite serious competition, all these transnational movements apparently converged on the agenda of realizing Islamic government.
3. If you look at the trend, the Ikhwan, HT and Shia congregations seem to have the most potential to continue to grow. In the future, these three networks will become serious rivals to the local Islamic movement.
4. Local Islamic movements (moderate Sunnis) seem to be the ones left behind in this global competition. This is because local Islamic movements are solely nation-state based and do not have a strong international network.

To be able to assess an Islamic movement that is considered radical, it must have objective criteria, so that it can avoid opinions that say that there is Radical Islam, even though in fact Islam is not a radical religion. The claims made by some parties overly generalize something that cannot be said to represent true Islam.

Global Jihad is a sectarian/local jihad which has turned into a concept of jihad without territorial boundaries, without territory. Initially, scholars agreed that Muslims who were oppressed in Syria, Palestine, Yemen, Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia or anywhere else in the world were obliged to fight jihad to protect themselves from infidels. Then recently there have been calls for extreme radical understanding which says that nowadays jihad is obligatory/fardu 'ain for all countries, and Muslims do not need permission from parents, husbands or waliy al-amr.

This concept of thought cannot be separated from the Khawarij fiqrah, as concluded by Shaikh Salih Fauzan that there are three principles of the Khawarij. First, disbelieve Muslims. Second, disobedience to waliyul 'amri. Third, make the blood of Muslims halal. Furthermore, the concept of jihad as such is identified with figures such as Yusuf Qardawi, Muhammad Surur bin Zainal 'Abidin, Salman al-Audah, Safar Al-Hawali, A'id al-Qarni, Nasir al-Umar, Abd al-Rahman Abd al-Khaliq. They are said to be deviant because of their enthusiasm for glorifying figures who have inherited various heretical understandings among Muslims, such as Sayyid Qutub, Hasan al-Banna, Muhammad Abduh, Jamaluddin al-Afgani, Muhammad Rasyid Rida and others. The concept of movement is not in accordance with the Salaf manhaj which is considered to 'mix up' various Islamic movements' manhaj with the Salaf's manhaj. For this reason, they use the tahzir method to regain the clarity of Islamic teachings.

As is known, the agenda for local jihad to become global jihad was clearly stated by Osama Bin Laden, leader of Al Qaeda. From there emerged the concept of jihad without

territorial boundaries, without territory. Osama, in his hiding place far from America, and carried out the attack on September 9, 2001, the World Trade Center was hit, collapsed and many died.

Then in June 2014, ISIS unilaterally declared itself the sole Islamic Caliphate. The official spokesperson stated that the cancellation of other ties that were reluctant to become subordinate (under them). The problem became increasingly serious when ISIS leaders and supporters began to implement the consequences of the belief that the highest and legitimate political and legal authority of Muslims was on their side. Starting from takfir, hijrah, territorial struggles, to the shedding of blood.

Between al-Qeda and ISIS there are fundamental differences, ISIS has proven to be the tactical and ideological antithesis to groups like al-Qaeda. Bin Laden wanted jihadists to target the “distant enemy” (the United States and its Western allies), whom he believed to be the root cause of all evil. Instead, ISIS focused on targeting a close enemy, an apostate domestic Muslim regime they called taghut.

Salaf da'wah is essentially an effort to follow the Al-Qur'an and the hadith of the Prophet in accordance with the understanding of the Salaf al-Saleh. Prominent da'wah activities are *hajr al-mubtadi'*, *tahdzir*, *amar ma'ruf nahi mungkar* and *jihad*. Acts of terrorism in the name of religion can actually be resolved with a correct understanding of Islam in accordance with the Salaf's understanding of *rahmatan lil 'alamin*. In addition to community-based community empowerment to make all levels of society anti-terrorism.

This Salafi da'wah movement is not a radical movement that is synonymous with violence, but an Islamic movement that brings grace and improvement among the people. There are many negative assumptions about Salafis circulating in society which in reality are just accusations that have no basis. A comprehensive study of the past history of the Muslim community is needed, and this includes the history of the Salaf al-Saleh generation who became role models for all Islamic movements, of course to varying degrees from one to another. There are many aspects of al-salaf's life that may be forgotten, such as politeness and wisdom, attitudes in responding to differences that are still possible to tolerate, as well as being proportional and fair in responding to mistakes or mistakes of other parties.

### **Islamic Dynamics in Southeast Asia**

Islam in Southeast Asia is complex and dynamic. The majority of Muslims in this region are Malays who have a unique cultural, social and political context. This explains the real differences between Islamic politics between Southeast Asia and the Middle East. At the same time, Muslim communities in Southeast Asia have for centuries been undeniably vulnerable to external influences. This influence is increasingly exposed to wider religious and political movements, including communities that convey extremist and radical messages. The inclusive, flexible and moderate Islamic tradition in Southeast Asia has become a dampener against radical and militant Islamic movements that increasingly exist and have a stronger mass following. Literal, Salafi and Wahhabi-oriented Islamic theological institutions as well as the politicization of Islam by the governments in Malaysia and

Indonesia, especially since the 1980s, have eroded traditional cultural and religious practices.

The conversion to Islam of a society often occurs several centuries after the arrival of Islam itself. Meanwhile, Islamization is a process of inviting Muslims to purify Islam from elements of non-Islamic beliefs and trying to ensure that Islam is implemented in various aspects of life, including religious rituals, economics, socio-culture, politics, law and government. Thus, Islamization is also related to the purification and renewal of Islam.

The typical characteristic of Islam in Southeast Asia, for example, as stated by Azyumardi Azra, is the more peaceful, friendly and tolerant nature of Islam. Thomas W. Arnold also concluded that the spread and historical development of Islam in Southeast Asia took place peacefully. Even in Southeast Asia, each colonized country fought for independence, some of these countries used da'wah for brotherhood and solidarity to fight colonialism. After independence, da'wah became an instrument for religious development and learning.

Islam's arrival and development in Southeast Asia had a process with various channels in its spread, such as through trade channels, marriage channels, Sufism channels, education channels, line art and political channels. Islam is a religion based on the revelation of the Al-Qir'an, so it is easily accepted by local communities. Overall, the history of Muslims in Southeast Asia has led to a struggle for articulation and assimilation with local culture, resulting in a new, dynamic and unique culture, the liberal civilization of Southeast Asia. With the acceptance of Islam in peace, as well as the development of Islamic civilization in its various aspects. Therefore, Southeast Asia is a field of struggle, as well as acculturation and assimilation of local culture, as well as among local cultural sesame. Therefore, it is in Southeast Asia that various religious systems live and develop.

Southeast Asian Islamic movements have largely avoided revolutionary approaches to political change and power, although some groups remain explicit about their desire to not only Islamize society but to establish an Islamic state. Southeast Asia is the most populous Islamic region in the world but has received only limited attention.

### **Islam in Indonesia**

According to Azyumardi Azra, Islamic renewal began in the Malay-Indonesian region in the 17th century, and not in the early 19th century or early 20th century, as some scholars Hamka and Federspiel believe, for example, believe that Islamic renewal began in the archipelago at the same time as the rise of the Pardi movement in West Sumatra at the beginning of the 19th century. Although Geertez admits that what he calls a "more precise Islam" (or "skipturalis Islam") had been introduced in the archipelago before the 19th century, he argues that "skipturalis Islam" reached momentum only after the 1810s with the revival of, e.g. in West Sumatra what he termed "a bunch of religious panicks", who were angry because of heterodoxy in local customs.

These reform activities can generally be divided into two large parts, namely educational movements and social movements on the one hand and political movements on the other. As a continuation of Islamic renewal in Indonesia, it was marked by the emergence

of Islamic organizations, both religious and political, and the emergence of several educational facilities such as: Islamic madrasas and formal schools.

Islamic renewal is the rediscovery of eternal teachings or basic principles that can transcend time and space. Environmental times and innovations may cause these basics to be less obvious and obscured by other habits and additional thoughts. The reformer group tries to restore the basic teachings by eliminating all kinds of additions that came later in the deen, religion, and by releasing Islamic adherents from jumud, frozen in world affairs. Some of the main foundations for renewal are as follows:

1. Returning to the basic teachings of Islam, namely the Koran and Hadith.
2. Changing traditional thinking to rational thinking.
3. Rejection of TBC (taqlid, bid'ah, khurafat).
4. Changing the traditional education system into a modern education system.
5. The teachings of the Qur'an and Hadith are in accordance with the times and advances in technology.

From several similarities in the ideas of reform figures in Indonesia, the role of Islamic reform concerns many aspects of life including educational aspects, political aspects, social aspects, monotheism aspects, and other aspects. Therefore, reform ideas can be seen from several aspects. According to Abdul Qodir, reform does not lie in the Al-Qur'an and Hadith, but renewal lies in the interpretation of the Al-Qur'an and Hadith.

### **Islam in Singapore**

Singaporean Muslims are – politically – a minority living in a plural and multi-cultural society. Since British colonization, ethnic, cultural and religious diversity has become increasingly apparent in this country as a consequence of the rapid migration flows, especially from ethnic Chinese. If we look at the relationship between state and religion, Singapore is known as a secular country, where the state is neutral in religious matters; does not support religious people nor Enyedi. Religion is a private matter, the government has no right and obligation to regulate the religion of each individual.

The government's understanding of secularism has implications for several policies. For example, the sound of the call to prayer, which serves as a reminder and call for Muslims to pray, cannot be played through loudspeakers. The reason is so that the majority of non-Muslims are not disturbed. Another example can be shown from the ban on wearing the hijab for Muslim female students in government schools, emphasizing that the ban on the hijab is intended to maintain integration and social harmony. However, on the religious side, it can also trigger conflict in religious communities if they cannot manage it well. For this reason, according to Azyumardi Azra: "multicultural life does require tolerance and the ability to adapt and integrate with all levels of society without reducing the meaning of religion and traditions of a particular community."

The implementation of Islamic propagation and its dynamics in Singapore cannot be separated from the function and important role of the Singapore Islamic Religious Council (MUIS) as the highest government institution for Islamic religious affairs. This institution, which is at the level of a ministry of religion in Indonesia, was established on July 1 1968



and has authority and responsibility for all religious activities related to matters of worship, law, economy, society, education and Islamic culture. More specifically, MUIS has the following main duties and functions:

1. Provide advice to the president on issues relating to the Islamic religion
2. Dealing with issues related to the Islamic religion and Muslims, including Hajj matters
3. Manage waqf and Muslim funds based on law and mandate.
4. Manage the collection of zakat, infaq and alms to support and broadcast the Islamic religion, or for the benefit of Muslims.
5. Manages all mosques and madrasas in Singapore.

In practice, this official state-owned body supervises mosques, has authority over the religious education curriculum, marriage, zakat, sacrifices, and so on. MUIS also monitors Friday sermons in each mosque to ensure the content of the sermons is in accordance with the concept of a pluralistic Singapore. Lecturers who come from abroad are also required to obtain a lecture permit from MUIS before they can give a lecture in Singapore.

The government's understanding of strategic secularism is reflected in the state's policy of intervening in the administrative affairs of Islam, Sikhism and Hinduism. This fact can be demonstrated from the many institutions or bodies that have been established and continue to coordinate with the government to regulate various aspects of the implementation of religion. In relation to the Islamic religion, the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS) is a relevant example. It was through MUIS that the government created a policy prohibiting the call to prayer from using loudspeakers.

On the other hand, the condition of Singaporean Muslims, who are a minority and live in a secular system, has not reduced their religious commitment and practice of Islam. They are able to respond to conditions realistically and contextualize their religion according to social problems and current conditions that are experiencing the rapid process of modernization. Although the government seems to be worried that religion will be an obstacle to the modernization process, it tends to emphasize that the country adheres to secularism.

### **Islam in Malaysia**

The Malaysian national census in 2000 recorded ethnic Malays at 65.1% of the total population. The remainder consists of 26% China; approximately 6.9 percent India; and 2 percent others. Talking about religion, Islam is the majority religion in the neighboring country. A survey conducted by the Pew Research Center's Forum on Religion & Public Life stated that Malaysian Muslims numbered 16,581,000 people, or 60.4% of the total population. 177 Meanwhile, the remaining 19.2% are Buddhists, 9% are Christians, 6.3% are Hindus, and only around 2.6% are adherents of traditional Chinese religion. The rest adhere to other religions, including animism, folk religion, Sikhism and other beliefs.

In recent developments, government support for Islam can be seen from the large-scale construction of an Islamic center in Putrajaya, as well as the intensification of Islamic programs and activities through this institution. Since the earliest period in Malaysia, Islam

has had close ties with Malay politics and society. Islam for Malays is not just a belief, but has also become their identity and the basis of Malay culture.

Since abandoning animist beliefs and embracing Islam during the Malacca kingdom (15th century), the identification of Malays and Islam, among others, can be attached to the nature of traditional Malay political leadership (sultanate), led by the sultan, there have also been political conceptions and thoughts influenced by the teachings of Islam. So, the Malay political tradition which was based on Hindu-Buddhism before the arrival of Islam has been replaced by ideas inspired by the Koran and other Islamic sources.

Apart from that, the laws enforced in various Malay sultanates such as Malacca, Johor, Pahang, Kedah and other sultanates in Malaya are laws that are inspired by Islamic law. However, as a result of British colonialization, Malay Islamic identity experienced degradation, because it was not uncommon for the colonial authorities to make various policies that weakened the function and role of Islam in Malay life. The British colonialists made a clear distinction between religion and state, introducing a civil administration and legal system that was different from the Islamic legal system and courts. One of the most tragic developments in Islamic history is the implementation of secularism with all its inherent elements, including the notion of separation between state and religion.

Colonization was not limited only to economic and political aspects, but also included colonization of thoughts and culture. British colonialism made a clear separation between religion and state. The implementation of Islamic law in the states of Malaysia during the sultanate has changed under British influence. The Islamic government system called the sultanate also experienced decline, as a result it was no longer able to play its role as protector of the spread of Islam as had previously happened.

In the Malaysian Constitution, Islam is recognized as the official state religion. Article 3 paragraph 1 confirms "Islam is the religion of the Federation; but other religions may be practiced in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation". Islam is a federated religion but at the same time, the constitution (UU) provides freedom of religion to non-Muslim communities. The practice of Islam became more visible, especially after the Islamic revival in Malaysia which occurred in the 1970s and reached its peak in the 1980s. The Islamic revival movement was also seen among students on Malaysian campuses. Among students there are religious study groups known as 'da'wah'.

### **Islam in Cambodia**

Islam arrived in Campa in the 9th century AD. The development of Islam among them occurred more rapidly after the capital of Campa, Vijaya, fell to Vietnam in 1471. After that, the Hindu-Buddhist culture in Campa was replaced by Islamic civilization. The Cam people who arrived in Cambodia brought with them Islamic religious beliefs which were still mixed with animist beliefs and Hindu-Buddhist religious teachings. From a social perspective, Cam-Malay Cambodians are given the freedom to practice Islam. They have a madrasah which is usually managed by the owner of the madrasah.

The practice of Islamic teachings in Cambodia since the arrival of the Cam and Malay people has gone smoothly without any problems even though there are two main groups,

namely the Cam Bani people and the orthodox Muslims of the Shafi'i school. Problems arose only after the independence of Cambodia where the understanding of the youth brought by Imam Musa came. From this point on, adherents of the Islamic religion began to split into two groups known as the Old People and the Young People.

Young people are practitioners of teachings that are contrary to Islam and are also said to be kufr. There are also teachings brought by Cam-Malay youth who graduated from universities in West Asia. They are believed to carry Wahhabi ideology. This problem began to arise in 1993, they were accused of bringing heretical teachings, usually originating from Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. The emergence of Ahmadiyya teachings again became apparent in 2000 and Shia teachings in 2010.

Another problem that emerged in the next few years in Cambodia is that there are more than 1,000 Christian organizations operating freely, compared to dozens of Islamic organizations. Now there are Christian books, including the Koran which has been translated into Cam language, which are being circulated among Muslims, especially among Cam Seven.

The development of Islam in Cambodia can be said to have experienced significant development. There are many schools founded by Muslims throughout the kingdom through the efforts of the Cam-Malays themselves, and a number of schools assisted by Muslims from outside, individuals or institutions, especially from Malaysia. There are full religious schools and integrated schools, namely schools that teach both programs, namely a combination of national and religious school programs.

### **Islam in Brunei Darussalam**

The majority of Brunei Darussalam's population is Malay, some are immigrants such as Chinese. One source state that 67.2% of the population is Muslim<sup>296</sup>; 13% Buddhist, 10% Christian; and another 10% hold other beliefs. About 20% of the population is ethnic Chinese, of which it is estimated that some of them are Christians (Anglicans, Catholics and Methodists) and others are Buddhists. There are also a number of workers from Australia, England, the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia who follow Islam, Christianity and Hinduism.

In the 15th century Islam is thought to have come to Brunei. A Portuguese note by de Brito in 1514, stated that the king of Brunei had not yet converted to Islam, but his traders were Muslim. Another report states that when Pegaffeta landed on the coast of Brunei in 1521, he saw a city with a dense population. King Awang Alak Betatar only converted to Islam later and was given the title Sultan Muhammad Shah (1363-1402). In 1402, Sultan Muhammad Syah was replaced by Sultan Ahmad (1408-1425). Although his name is not mentioned in the Salasilah Raja Raja Brunei (Laws and Regulations of Bruneian Kings).

Brunei reached its heyday during the reign of the 5th sultan, Nakhoda Ragam, who had the title Sultan Bolkiah (1485-1584). He succeeded in conquering all of Borneo to the northern part of Luzon, the Philippine archipelago. Brunei gained independence from Britain in 1984. Brunei's constitution confirms that the official religion of Brunei Darussalam is Islam according to the Shafi'i school of thought. Although other religions such as

Christianity, Buddhism and Hinduism can be embraced and implemented in peace and harmony, the government emphasizes a number of restrictions for adherents of non-Islamic religions, including prohibiting non-Muslims from spreading their religious teachings. In late 2000 and 2001 the government detained several Christians, because of alleged subversive (underground) activities. They were finally released in October 2001 after swearing allegiance to the Sultan.

The central position of Islam was once again strengthened by the establishment of Tabung Amanah Islam Brunei (TAIB) or Dana Amanah Islam Brunei, which is the first financial institution in Brunei to be run based on Islamic law. In order to produce qualified human resources, in Brunei there are a number of educational institutions, including another, the University of Brunei Darussalam (UBD). This university was founded in 1985. In 1991, it was recorded that this university had produced 500 graduates. In 1991 a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed with UTM to strengthen cooperation in the fields of education and training.

### **Islam in Thailand**

Muslims in Thailand are a minority group. In this country. Muslims only number 3,930,0008 people (5.7%) of the total population. Meanwhile, the majority of the population adheres to Buddhism, namely around 80%. At the beginning of the Thai government, which was controlled by the army of General Luang Pibulsongkram, who led from 1938-1944, Marshal Sarit Thanarat, 1958-1963 and other general leaders, Thailand's policy of cultural nationalism became the main policy. The problem faced by Thai and Filipino Muslims is the problem of minority groups who must live side by side peacefully with non-Muslims, in the same country.

The process of Islamization among the population occurred more intensively in the 12th to 15th centuries. Sheikh Said from Kampong Pasai The socio-political institutions of the sultanate have at least attempted to support the Islamization process by practicing Islam in everyday life. However, further efforts to sharpen the roots of Islamization of this society were hampered by the political instability of the sultanate. In fact, Thai Muslims preferred to secede from the Muangtha kingdom or join Malaysia, even though it was under British rule, because that way they could live together.

Muslims in Thailand are basically divided into two groups, namely the assimilated group and the unassimilated group. The cultural assimilation policy in the Kingdom of Thailand came into effect during the reign of General Phibul Songkhram as mentioned at the beginning of this research. During the reign of General Phibul Songkhram (1938-1944 and 1947-1957), the policy of nationalizing Thai culture became the country's primary policy. Starting from efforts to assimilate Thai language and culture throughout Thailand, including in the southern region, which then created resistance from the Malay Muslim community who spoke Malay.

As a result, many Malays Muslims fail to enter state schools to access education. Even in schools, the Malay Muslim community is prohibited from using Malay in daily conversations. Phibul Songkhram's policy was supported by the absolute and untouchable

political system in Thailand. This system is in the Thai government, called "bureaucratic politics" where the government strictly controls the lives of Malay Muslims. This policy was basically to eliminate Thai Muslim identity, especially preventing resistance in the southern region.

The Thai government's integration policies and programs are very worrying for the Patani Muslim people. These policies include wearing Western-style clothing, adopting Thai names if you want to enter government schools or if you want to apply for jobs within the government. Malay is prohibited from being taught in state schools or used in conversations with government officials.

The conflict in Southern Thailand is very strongly influenced by religious values. They see this conflict as a fight between Malay Muslims and Thai Buddhists. The words 'Muslim' and 'Buddhist' refer to the strong influence of religion in each society. As a result of the prolonged conflict, security assistance came in to deal with 'guerrillas' from the South. In February 2004, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) asked the Thai government to end acts of violence against Muslims in the southern region of Thailand. This call became one of the points in the statement on the results of the meeting in Jeddah between the Secretary General of the OIC, Prof. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu and Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi, who chaired the 10th Islamic Summit.

Muslims in Thailand can be said to be culturally violent. The cultural violence in question is the cultural aspect, the symbolic realm of our existence shown by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science which can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence. Until now, it is a minority. Malay Muslims in Thailand are still far from being able to live their lives comfortably. Because they remain a minority who continue to experience endless pressure and discrimination. If this condition occurs continuously, it can cause acute traumatic effects on a human being.

In Thailand, environmental changes resulting from social cultural assimilation policies have had a negative impact on Muslims. It could even be said that the policy of cultural assimilation is a form of psychological warfare. Muslim communities continue to receive pressure to change their identity by force. However, the Malay Muslim community put up resistance which then sparked a prolonged conflict. Thai Muslims feel that the dignity of their group has been trampled on by the arbitrariness of the Thai government.

Another Thai leader who is also very discriminatory against Muslims is Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Thaksin Shinawatra issued a repressive policy against Muslims in southern Thailand. In an effort to resolve the conflict in the south, the King of Thailand actually ordered state bureaucrats to take a welfare approach. But Thaksin Shinawatra actually imposed a military emergency which he implemented on January 5, 2004. This condition created a stigma that Muslims were a criminal group behind religion.

### **Islam in the Philippines**

Filipino Muslims are a minority group, in this country there are approximately 4,654,000 people or 5.1% of the total population of the Philippines. They are in a dilemma

about how to reconcile their fundamental Islamic beliefs with the need to be good citizens (full citizenship) in countries dominated by non-Muslims.

In the 13th century, exactly in 1380, Islam entered the Southern Philippines, especially the Sulu and Mindanao islands. The first person to introduce Islam to Sulu was Mr. Mashaika who is thought to have arrived in Sulu. Next the 14th century. The person who came to spread Islam in Sulu was an Arab cleric named Karimul Makhdum in the second half. He was well received by the Buansa Muslim community. At the beginning of the 15th century, another propagator of Islam came to Sulu, namely Raja Baginda. At this time Islam had begun to develop, it had even become a requirement for someone to enter the region.

When Spain arrived in the Philippines, they implemented the politics of divide and rule (divide and rule) and mision-sacre (holy mission of Christianization) towards Muslims. Even Muslims are stigmatized (given a nickname with a bad connotation) as Moors (Moro), meaning people who are illiterate, evil, godless and huramentados (murderers). Spain then sold the Philippines to the United States for USS. 20 million in 1898 through the Treaty of Paris. Basically, this policy was more due to America's desire to incorporate Muslims into the mainstream of Philippine society in the North and to assimilate Muslims into Christian traditions and customs.

Philippines' independence in (1946) from the United States apparently had no special meaning for the Moro Nation. The general policy of the Philippine government towards Muslims is basically unchanged, only varying in intensity from one president to another. The Manila government has four points of view towards Muslims.

1. The government still holds the colonial view, namely "a good Moro is a dead Moro.
2. Muslims are second class citizens in the Philippines.
3. Muslims are an obstacle to development.
4. The Moron problem is an integration problem, namely how to integrate them into the main stream of the national political body.

While the largest part of Filipino Muslims does not have a sense of national identity due to:

1. Muslims find it difficult to respect national laws, especially those regarding personal and family relationships, because they are clearly derived from Western and Catholic moral values.
2. The public school system under the Republic was no different from those introduced by colonial America and those developed by the commonwealth.
3. The inability of the Muslims to consider themselves citizens of the Republic and the subsequent violent reaction was due to their deep hatred of the steady influx of settlers into parts of Mindanao.

These government policies have invited a number of protests and resistance from Muslims. From here, resistance fronts emerged and were formed such as the Muslim Independent Movement (MIM) in 1968, Anshar el-Islam, and the Moro Liberation Front (MLF) in 1971.

It seems that peace between Filipino Muslims and non-Muslims will still be difficult to achieve if both parties are not willing to push each other. In fact, 50 percent of companies

in the Philippines do not want to employ Muslim employees. This kind of attitude, according to Zainudin, could trigger hatred among Muslims who are treated unfairly. "If this is not eliminated, it means they are also promoting terrorism," he said. News on October 18, 2008 reported that the President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, vowed not to stop carrying out military attacks against Muslim guerrillas who were occupying villages and attacking cities in the Mindanao region, south of the country. He even urged the army to continue carrying out operations against Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) guerrillas.

#### Philippine Government Policy to achieve Peace and Reconciliation

1. The formation of an autonomous Regional Government (RAG) is the formation of two autonomous Regional Governments. The two Governments are a political unity to strengthen local government which functions: Encouraging the achievement of peace and stability. Replacing people and families who were previously displaced to other places. others. Accelerate socio-economic development of the region.
2. Establishment of the Ministry of Religious Affairs  
Establishment of the Philippine Ministry of Islamic Religious Affairs, tasked with establishing policies that ensure the integration of Muslim Filipinos into Philippine society as a whole while respecting their beliefs, customs, traditions and institutions in line with the goals of national aspirations.
3. Philippine Hajj Management Agency  
This body has the power to initiate and manage all relevant programs for the implementation of the annual Hajj pilgrimage.
4. Established Islamic Studies at the University of Manila and Established the King Faisal Center for Islamic and Arabic Studies, Mindanao State University. This institute encourages and supports various research conducted by Muslim students. This institution is also a meeting center for scientists interested in Islamic history and culture. And currently it is one of the largest Islamic Libraries in the Philippines.
5. Southern Philippines Center for Peace Studies  
The long-term goal of this Peace Center is to introduce peace education to lay people and students, to present more objective and reliable facts regarding the history and causes of conflict in the Southern Philippines, and as an alternative to produce lasting peace, love and mutual understanding between fellow residents of the Southern Philippines region.
6. Launching the Philippines Amanah Bank and Muslim Development Fund Fifty percent (50%) of the bank's profits will be channeled to the Muslim Development Fund (MDF), which was established to finance a number of social, educational, cultural and economic development projects for the Muslim community.

#### Islam in Myanmar

Myanmar is a country with a majority population that adheres to Buddhism. There are 90% of the total population of 55,400,000. 328 Meanwhile, about 4.5% of the rest are Christians, 1.5% Hindus, most of whom live outside the city, and the rest are others. 329 Meanwhile, Muslims only number 1,889,000 people, or around 3.8% of the total population.

The largest Muslim population is the Rohingya ethnic group, which is currently experiencing conflict.

Islam entered Myanmar with the arrival of Arab Muslims in the 7th century via trade routes. As usual, the mission carried out by traders is not just a trading mission, but there is a more important mission, namely the mission to spread the religion of Islam. In the 9th century, another part that was visited by Muslims in the early generations of Muslims was the Burmese Ayeyarwady River Delta, which is located on the Tanintharyi coast and in Rakhine. The existence of Muslims and the first Islamic da'wah was documented by Arab, Persian, European and Chinese adventurers. The next path is the marriage path, which is used as a way of preaching, Islam is spreading in Myanmar, the largest Muslim population is in the Rohingya ethnicity.

The Rohingya ethnicity has physical similarities with Bangladeshis. Being descended from a mixture of Bengalis, Persians, Mongols, Turks, Malays and Arabs, this makes Rohingya culture slightly different from most Myanmar people. The language is heavily influenced by Arabic, Persian, Urdu and Bengali. Until finally in 1430 AD Arakan became a Muslim country, for 350 years the Muslim kingdom existed in Arakan and Muslims lived in peace. However, on September 24, 1784, AD, the king of Boddaw Paya from Burma invaded Arakan and took control of it.

Myanmar's independence in 1948 brought a sad story for followers of the Islamic faith. The Rohingya are the most oppressed ethnic group in Myanmar. Apart from being persecuted, the Rohingya are also not recognized as part of the Myanmar nation, even though the Rohingya have been in Arakan since the 7th century AD. Talking about violence and discrimination by the Myanmar government, it is not only carried out against the Rohingya ethnic group, but also to Christians and other non-majority ethnicities such as Shan, Kachin, Karen, Chin, and others.

There are several attitudes of oppression, both physical and moral.

1. Muslim women are not permitted to wear the hijab
2. Many women were forced to work in barracks.
3. They are also often raped without mercy.
4. They are also denied the right to medical treatment, both in hospitals and in clinics. They are also forced to pay exorbitant prices for the treatment they receive.
5. Muslims are also not allowed to get involved in politics.
6. Social institutions are prohibited from providing assistance to them.
7. Muslims are not allowed to perform the Hajj or slaughter sacrifices during Eid al-Adha.

The massacre of Rohingya Muslims has been going on for decades. The most tragic thing happened in 1942, around 100,000 Rohingya people were massacred and their space for movement was limited, and their place of residence was only in the northern part of Arakan. The conflict escalated again in June 2012, when the majority Rakhine population, a Buddhist extremist group supported by the Myanmar government, attacked a bus and killed 10 Muslims. The conflict spread and left hundreds of people dead, hundreds injured, tens of thousands of houses burned, and hundreds of people arrested and forcibly detained. This



conflict resulted in Rohingya Muslims being forced to be expelled from their homeland and fleeing to several nearby countries by boat.

According to a PIARA report based in Indonesia, currently the Rohingya Muslim population in Arakan, Myanmar numbers approximately one million people. Hundreds of thousands of others live in refugee camps in various countries, including the borders of Bangladesh, Pakistan, the Arabian Peninsula, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia, and there are also some who live and have fled to England, America and Japan.

The factor that drives ethnic conflict between Rohingya and Rakhine in Myanmar is mostly due to the discrimination experienced by the Rohingya ethnic group, which has caused chaos in Rakhine Province. They created disputes with the local ethnic Rakhine population who lived side by side with them.

#### 1. Weak State Factor

Pressure from military institutions based on authoritarian political policies. This is what makes the ethnic conflict involving the Rakhine ethnic group and the Rohingya experience a security dilemma which leads to instability in Rakhine Province. There is a level of social welfare that is getting lower day by day where out of 3,183,330 people, 85% of the population depends on the agricultural sector for their livelihoods, but agricultural productivity has decreased in recent years in line with the hostile climate. This urges the Rakhine ethnic group to control the Rohingya ethnic agricultural land in order to increase agricultural productivity. They expelled, looted and burned the Rohingya alive with the help of the military junta under the authority of the Rakhine monks.

#### 2. Political Factors

The conflict between the Rakhine ethnic group and the Rohingya ethnic Bengali people occurred because the military junta always distributed anti-Muslim pamphlets aimed at the Rohingya ethnic group. Hantha in Taungoo was destroyed, Muslims who did not accept their abuses were involved in clashes with local residents as many as 200 Muslims were killed, 11 mosques were destroyed, and 400 houses were burned. Many monks were also influenced by the military junta's initiative by distributing similar leaflets in the Taunggup area, resulting in many Muslims being persecuted for no apparent reason from the local population.

#### 3. Exclusive National Ideological Factors

During the UNU government, the government declared Buddhism as the national religion and planned to form 2 new states, namely Mon and Rakhine (Arakan), which were not yet included in the Union of Burma. This controversial political policy has caused disputes between ethnic Rakhine and Rohingya ethnic Bengalis. because since this policy agenda was implemented, the influence of the monks has increased in influencing the political situation in Myanmar, they have even imposed their views on the entire Burmese community, including the Rohingya ethnic Bengalis who are Muslims, to realize Theravada Buddhism as a national religion. The Rohingya ethnic radicals who are members of the Mujahideen movement are trying to fight the Rakhine ethnic group by carrying out a rebellion.

## Handling Southeast Asian Radical Movements

One of the problems faced today is the threat of the evolution of jihad-salafism, an extreme and violent variant of militant Sunni Islamism, in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines which presents worrying security challenges for Southeast Asian countries in particular. Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines must make efforts to combat the evolution of jihad-salafism and anticipate it because the stability of Southeast Asia will be threatened. The ongoing events in the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia provide a dire warning about the consequences of underestimating conflicts that can occur, especially those in the name of religion.

Azumardi Azra explained that Islamic studies still focus on the Middle East as the main axis. The stigma about the existence of Islam in Southeast Asia as a peripheral part of Islam is still attached globally. In fact, the current social, political, economic and cultural conditions in Southeast Asia have shown that the existence of Islamic communities in this region must be taken into account. One effort to develop Southeast Asian Islam is through several forums such as the Southeast Asia Association for Islamic Studies (SEAFIS). It is hoped that SEAFIS, which was declared by Jamhari Makruf, can become a forum that focuses on bringing together scholars who make Southeast Asian Islam the core of their research interests. It is hoped that the forum will help build a network that will strengthen and promote Southeast Asian Islamic Studies.

In Southeast Asia, Talibanization and the influence of al-Qaeda and ISIS on jihad appear to have initiated regional radical Salafi movements such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Jama'ah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), and Hizbut Tahrir (HT). Although it is said that radical Salafis differ from traditional Salafis because of their belief in the use of force to achieve political-religious goals. Indonesia has been the center of this movement and their presence has been felt in Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Thailand and the Philippines. Some of them actively spread the concept of jihad, which means war. Their struggle consists of at least three things. Purification of Islam, stemming the flow of secularization and restoring the Islamic caliphate.

Controversial issues in Southeast Asian Islam such as Islamic revivalism, the outbreak of ethno-religious conflict and the possibility of a greater threat of extremism. The relationship between the state and Islam, whether in precolonial, colonial or contemporary formats, is still a problem. Various models of Islamic politics in Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines found their own forms. Not to mention the oppression of Muslim minorities in Buddhist or Christian majority countries such as Thailand, Burma and the Philippines. This makes the problem even more complex.

The typology of Islamic militancy in the Southeast Asian region has 3 typologies according to Abuza: First, Jemaah Islamiyah and AI-Qaida are not the same, a fact that allows the denial of the association. However, this denial does not mean that these organizations are not comrades in arms. Second, terrorism in the Southeast Asian context results from a lack of political freedom and political efficacy, which gives rise to resistance efforts, and which shows that armed rebellion and terrorism are not the same. Third, governments in general (including the United States), but Southeast Asian governments in

particular, are not ready for aggressive action against Islamic militants, especially in new democracies; effective action against militant Islam often looks like the suppression of Islam and the legitimate aspirations of the majority of people in a way that is untenable in a democratic society.

According to Abdallah, there are 3 points that can be applied to anticipate religious radicalism. First, at the national level, countries in Southeast Asia must promote the principle of inclusion as part of national identity, formulating legal protections for minorities. ASEAN countries should establish regional capacity building for their officials to counter extremism by strengthening moderate education through the development of national curricula and teacher training.

Second, at the country level, Indonesia must strengthen resistance to extremist propaganda through public education that focuses on inclusive values, democracy and citizenship. The education system as a whole must revive a cooperative attitude so that every student and citizen can feel that they have a stake in society. Also, the government should use its authority to supervise religious education curricula in private schools and religious education to contribute to preventing violent extremism.

Three, at the societal level, the education system as a whole must strive to minimize the cracks created in the community. Fourth, at the school level, education must have initiatives to teach anti-discrimination and acceptance of differences both culturally and religiously, and foster interaction between ethnicities and between religions.

Comprehensive depiction starting from militant Islamic group decision making, recruitment, tactics, strategy and ideology. They collectively highlight the importance of local context for understanding the behavior of Islamic militant groups. It is important for counter-terrorism practitioners that local knowledge and in-depth knowledge of program design are critical to success in countering violent extremism. and by carrying out development based on community empowerment.

Radicalism is a historical phenomenon of all religions, not just an Islamic phenomenon. In Islam, a radical ideology is developing among Muslims who identify themselves with Salafi Islam, namely an Islamic group or movement that calls for a return to the Koran and Hadith. In subsequent developments, this call for religious purification developed into an ideology of takfir and terror. The emergence of issues of Islamic radicalism is a new challenge for Muslims in the midst of global relations. Salafis have long been identified as a radical Islamic movement because they believe that Islam is not just a religion but also an ideology at the same time.

Radicalism, which leads to acts of terrorism is a crime that has complex roots and networks that cannot only be approached using an institutional approach through law enforcement alone. The involvement of the community, especially educational institutions, families and the community as well as the young generation itself in preventing terrorism is very important. That is why it requires the involvement of all components of society in fighting terrorism for the sake of preserving the peaceful, just and prosperous life of our beloved nation and state.

## CLOSING

Radical ideology is developing among Muslims who identify themselves with Salafis, namely Islamic groups or movements that call for a return to the Koran and Hadith. In subsequent developments, it underwent contextualization with various variants. The main Salafi movement is identified with the main agenda of purifying the faith or containing secularism or restoring the Islamic caliphate or a form of resistance to imperialism. The emergence of religious radicalism is a new challenge for Muslims in the midst of international relations.

The dynamics of Southeast Asian Muslims with its distinctive characteristics is a more peaceful, friendly and tolerant Islam. Although we cannot deny the problem of radical Salafi ideology, Islamic revivalism, ethno-religious conflict and the threat of extremism are inevitable. The relationship between the state and Islam, whether in precolonial, colonial or contemporary formats, is still an issue. The various forms of Islamic political movements in each country, such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, have their own unique characteristics. Not to mention the situation of minority Muslims in Buddhist or Christian majority countries such as Thailand, Burma and the Philippines where there have been prolonged conflicts. Apart from all that, the characteristics of Southeast Asia are considered to be a prototype for the future of moderate Islam bringing grace in dialogue with civilization. Current social, political, economic and cultural conditions in Southeast Asia have shown that the existence of Islamic communities in this region must be taken into account.

A comprehensive study is needed starting from the goals, recruitment, tactics, strategy and ideology of radical groups to resolve the root of the problem. The involvement of the community, especially educational institutions, families and the community as well as the young generation itself in preventing terrorism is very important. That is why it requires the involvement of all components of society in fighting terrorism for the sake of preserving the peaceful, just and prosperous life of our beloved nation and state.

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